Many long wars were initially expected to be short affairs. "Home by Christmas" was what many on both sides believed when World War 1 started. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States probably predicted that they would have to fight very long insurgencies in Afghanistan. Most recently, Vladimir Putin intended a short and victorious war in Ukraine and certainly did not want to get bogged down there for more than 4 years now. At the start of conflicts, political leaders and ordinary folk alike express conviction or hope that a war will end soon, either through poor calculation or simply out of basic human nature,

hoping that a bad thing will not last long. Today, we once again talk about the war in Iran - this time trying to answer the question: Is it going to turn into another long war? ESCALATION We have already made a video describing how the war in Iran has been going on so far, so, we are not going to talk in depth about who did what and the impact of things that the sides have done to each other. You can go ahead and watch our previous video for that. Instead, we are going to start by analyzing how different escalatory steps of the sides impact the length of this war and then try to understand the main arguments for

a short war and a long war. First of all, on a strategic level, there is not much the sides can really do anymore at the current step of the escalatory ladder. The US and Israel have so far mostly targeted Iran's political and military leadership, military industrial complex, military bases, missile and drone infrastructure, naval and air defense assets, nuclear infrastructure, airports, and oil and gas extraction infrastructure. Iran has meanwhile responded by targeting the American bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries, Israeli and Gulf cities and

infrastructure, the Gulf oil and gas facilities, and the most consequential response of all is the closure of transportation through the Strait of Hormuz. The sides can continue doing more of the same. Of course, the advantage for intensity, precision and damage is on the side of the US and Israel, but striking a few more military bases and oil depots will not force Iran to surrender, or alter the strategic situation. At this level of escalation, only the complete elimination of Iran's missile and drone production facilities and missile launchers can potentially alter the

current status quo, since it will deprive Iran of its main deterrent and retaliation weapon. According to the Reuters sources, the US has destroyed one-third of Iran's missile arsenal, while another one-third may have been damaged or inaccessible, being buried in bunkers. Another source claimed that a third of Iran's drone capability has been destroyed as well. Meanwhile, a senior Israeli military official has told the Institute for the Study of the War that Israel has managed to destroy 290 out of the estimated 410-440 missile launchers that Iran had prior

to the war. Both of these factors, along with the total air domination by the US and Israel, have decreased both missile and drone attacks by Iran significantly. First of all, because Iran has already used some of its reserves. Second, because many missile depots have been destroyed, including some underground missile depots, which may be inaccessible to the Iranians now. Third, due to the air domination of the US and Israel, Iran has to be careful while using mobile missile launchers, since any missile launch creates a heat signature, which gets noticed by its enemies. This

detects Iran's missile launchers. While this does not mean their immediate and imminent destruction, it is certainly a risk. Thus, Iran has to be careful to preserve their launchers after losing so many. This has further decreased the number of missile launches. Along with that, according to the military experts interviewed by the Washington Post, significant damage has been inflicted on Iran's Khojir, Parchin, Hakimiyeh and Shahroud missile propellant producers and missile assembly facilities, key elements of Iran's missile

production infrastructure. Moreover, at least 29 missile launch sites have been struck by the US and Israel, which further complicates the situation for Iran. But Iran's missile and drone production has always been decentralized, some elements of which are deep underground. This means that at least some of the military production may have survived. And since the 10th day of the war, the number of missiles and drones launched by Iran has been quite stable, with an average of around 30-35 missiles and 70 drones. So, unless the US and Israel locate

and destroy ALL critical production facilities, Iran will continue launching missiles and drones. Even if in smaller numbers. As a professor at the Doha Institute, Muhanad Seloom puts it, "It takes one successful drone to shatter a sense of security." As long as Iran is capable of making long-range strikes, the status quo at this stage of escalation will not be altered dramatically. So, unless one of the sides decides to escalate the war, it is difficult to see how either side can gain a further advantage. What kind of escalation are we talking about? Well, first

of all, the sides can expand the type of objects they strike and the intensity of strikes on them. Of course, the US and Israel have already hit many oil and gas facilities in Iran, while Tehran has responded by doing the same to the Gulf countries. However, we are not yet at the escalatory stage, wherein the sides would target the adversary's oil and gas industry for full destruction. The South Pars gas field is arguably the single most crucial gas facility of Iran. It accounts for roughly 70-75% of Iran's gas production and holds about 40% of Iran's total gas reserves. Around 85%

of electricity produced in Iran depends on gas, so the destruction of the infrastructure on this gas field would be a massive blow to both Iran's electricity supply and its exports. On March 18, Israel conducted a strike on the South Pars, which was a clear escalation to the degree of forcing Donald Trump to tweet basically denouncing this attack. But not just conducting a limited strike and actually destroying the Iranian side of the gas field would be an even bigger escalation. The same is true for Kharg Island, the energy hub responsible for almost 90% of Iran's oil

exports. The US strikes have reportedly destroyed military targets on the island, but so far have spared the oil infrastructure. They can as easily obliterate the oil infrastructure on the Island, which would be a massive blow to Iran and constitute a major escalation. One of the things stopping this from happening is Iran's potential retaliation - they can target the destruction of the Qatar side of the South Pars gas field and other crucial oil and gas facilities of the Gulf countries, such as the Ras Laffan energy hub, the North Field offshore gas

reservoir of Qatar, the Ras Tanura refinery, Yanbu oil port, the East-West pipeline of Saudi Arabia, the Shah gas field and the Fujairah port of the UAE. Some of these facilities have already been hit hard, but Iran can elect to send larger salvos of missiles, trying to destroy them for good. Any side attempting not just to harm, but to destroy the other's oil and gas infrastructure would mean a total energy war and a global energy crisis that the world has never seen before, with undoubtedly disastrous consequences for basically everyone. Iran can also retaliate by destroying desalination

plants in the Gulf countries, which are strategic facilities for them, as they supply the vast majority of drinking and industrial water. Their destruction has the potential to cause a regional humanitarian and refugee crisis within weeks in the Gulf countries. This is exactly what has been deterring the sides from moving up in the escalation ladder. This does not mean it won't happen, but it is still quite unlikely. Another obvious escalatory step, which the US-Israel coalition can take, is sending ground troops to Iran. Although the United States publicly remains committed to winning this war without deploying ground forces,

the fact that it has sent an additional 3,500 troops to the Middle East, and rumblings from the corridors of Washington reflected in the American media, indicate that at least a limited ground operation is being considered. The most discussed scenarios are the deployment and longer-term presence of American troops on the Kharg Island to take control of Iran's main export hub, or on the Qashm Islands to disrupt Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Limited operations, such as missions to capture Iran's enriched uranium is also discussed as an

option. But particularly the first two options may be very costly for the American servicemen, since they will instantly become targets of Iranian missiles and drones. Operating and remaining in a closed space under such circumstances would be extremely problematic. There is very little appetite in America for a ground assault, and losing American servicemen on the ground in Iran would make the public support for this war, which is already quite shaky, even lower. So, it is not exactly a foregone conclusion that the American military will conduct a ground operation in Iran.

ARGUMENTS FOR A SHORT WAR Bottom line - there is little to suggest that at the current level of escalation, the strategic outlook of this war will change in either side's favor. And it is not a given that the sides will be ready to escalate further due to the deterrence both sides still possess and due to unclear prospects of further escalation by the United States and Israel, which will almost certainly backfire into a global energy crisis. That is the biggest argument in favor of a short war. Continuing and escalating the war is very risky, particularly without actually guaranteeing success for the United States. Signals from Donald

Trump and his cabinet members indicate that the United States may just declare victory and exit the war. In late March and early April, Trump said that they will be "out of Iran pretty quickly", "within two weeks, maybe two weeks, maybe three", as the United States is apparently on track to fulfil all its objectives "shortly, very shortly". U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed these sentiments, saying that the United States expected to finish its operation in "weeks, not months". He also proclaimed the destruction of missile and drone production facilities,

missile launchers and the elimination of Iran's air force as the main objectives of the United States in this war. So, on the one hand, the president is conveying the message that they have basically obliterated Iran, and they would be leaving in a matter of weeks. On the other hand, the secretary of state is purposefully tempering the expectations of the war and omitting harder objectives like regime change or the complete destruction of Iran's nuclear program. A long war brings the flashbacks of Iraq and Afghanistan, which the American government wants to desperately

avoid. The war in Iran has already caused a major hike in oil prices, and the longer this war goes on and the longer the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the worse the global economy is going to get. Fuel and food prices will rise significantly, supply chains will be disrupted, industries will slow down, shortages will become more apparent, and so on. The potential impact of the war in Iran on the global economy is a major topic, and deserves a video of its own to describe what might happen. We are not going to dive any deeper here, but beyond any doubt, it will have

very many negative consequences. This will be felt in the United States, too, and the last thing that Trump and the Republicans need with the looming midterm elections in November is another long war in the Middle East, with inflation at home. It is not impossible to imagine Trump declaring victory, pulling back, blaming others for the mess of this war's making and advising them to clean up this mess instead of him. What about Israel? Messages from the Israeli leadership do not indicate that they will exit the war in the short term. However, for what it is

worth, Israel's prime minister, Netanyahu, stated on March 31 that the war was "beyond the halfway point", while IDF's spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nadav Shoshani said Israel was prepared to keep operating for "weeks to come. To assess whether Israel may indeed prefer to stop the war soon, we need to understand what the key goal of Israel in this war is. At his March 19 press conference, Netanyahu explicitly spelled out three goals: removing the nuclear threat, removing the ballistic missile threat and creating conditions for the Iranian people to topple the regime. If we

boil these down to a single strategic goal, it is to turn Iran into a non-threat. Make sure it would not be able to strike Israel from a long distance, make sure it is not in a position to support its allies and proxies in the Middle East and completely eliminate the nuclear threat. And one can argue that Israel has made some progress in achieving these goals. We have already discussed Iran's missile capabilities - it has survived so far, but it has been badly degraded. The fate of Iran's enriched uranium is unclear, but its key nuclear facilities have been severely damaged,

too. Iran is in flames, its military and civilian infrastructure is in shambles, and many of its leaders have been killed. It will take years, if not longer, for Iran to restore its pre-war capacity of military production and threat generation. Part of its axis has been defeated, while the others have been significantly weakened. Another favorable outcome of the war for Israel is that the relations between Tehran and the Gulf countries are at an all time low, and any rapprochement between them in the near future is extremely unlikely. So, why not just declare victory and exit the war? After all, if Iran starts to rebuild its nuclear

and missile program, it can bomb them once again. A short war may be a better option for Iran for a range of reasons. First, the war ending will stop the destruction of the country, assassination of its leaders and killing of the civilians, the death toll of which has already exceeded 1900 people. The regime has survived and shown its resilience. Continuing the war is risky. What would happen if the US and Israel escalate and completely destroy Iran's energy grid and oil and gas infrastructure? There is a chance it could cause societal collapse, unrest, and defections

from the regime. The war, by its nature, is unpredictable, and further pressure from the enemy may just finally put too much strain on the regime and lead to its collapse. So, why not just take the W, after you have demonstrated that you are capable of resisting, after you have preserved the regime, while at least some of the industry and infrastructure are still surviving? LONG WAR But, unfortunately, it is never so simple. For all the destruction inflicted by the United States and Israel on Iran, they have not been able to achieve their main strategic goals. If they exit the war right now, the regime,

although weakened, will still be there. And many expect it to be even more radical against America and Israel for obvious reasons. Iran may have fewer missiles and drones to launch, but if it is still capable of producing them, it can ramp up production to restore its deterrence. Moreover, now they should have a better idea of how to hide their facilities from America and Israel. The same is largely true for Iran's remaining nuclear infrastructure. Since the US and Israel have not claimed control over Iran's enriched uranium, Iran probably still has it. Some of the infrastructure

has also presumably survived. If the United States and Israel stop the war right now, they may never get a chance to face Iran in such a weakened state. The war stopping right now would give Iran breathing space. The likeliest scenario if the regime survives is for Iran to turn into a proper military dictatorship with the IRGC as the most powerful structure. And the main focus of such leadership is going to be on restoring Iran's military capacity, including its missile and drone production infrastructure. Stopping the war will also allow American adversaries like China and

Russia to help Iran more actively and openly with rebuilding the country and its military capacity. Along with that, the United States and Israel have already poured a lot of resources into this war. Stopping it short of achieving a clear victory would cause questions at home to the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government. What was the point of all this, if the regime and its nuclear capability are still there? This is where the sunk-cost fallacy may come into play. We have already done so much, let's push a little bit more, let's bomb more and see where it leads us.

This will be especially true if the United States decides to send in ground troops to occupy some land or conduct a limited operation and suffer casualties. It may cause a temptation to send more troops to avenge death, which would mean a vicious circle that prolongs the war and is tough to exit. But what if Trump follows through on his statements and actually leaves the war due to the myriad of factors, which we discussed a few minutes earlier, without a ceasefire or a peace deal? There is no guarantee that Israel and Iran will stop, even if America exits the war. Israel may continue striking Iran, occupying Lebanon,

while Iran may continue attacking Iran and the Gulf countries. Surely, over time, the intensity may drop, but a low-intensity war is still a war with escalatory potential. On top of that, Netanyahu may have a personal political interest in a longer war, since a national election is expected in Israel this year, and a clear and tangible success is crucial to his electoral success after 3 years of war, which has worn down Israeli society. Of course, Netanyahu is still facing criminal proceedings for corruption and the wars in Gaza and now in Iran have clearly slowed

and disrupted the trial proceedings against him. But again, even if Israel exits the war tomorrow, where is the guarantee that Iran will not keep striking it? And the probability of Israel not responding to strikes from Iran is extremely low, which pushes things back into the vicious circle. But let's presume for a second that the United States and Israel do indeed exit the war without reaching some sort of deal with Iran. It still won't solve all the problems created specifically by this war. Particularly, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It remains the biggest leverage at Tehran's disposal, and they are extremely unlikely to end the

blockade without getting anything in exchange, for instance, guarantees that the United States and Israel do not attack them anymore. A senior Iranian official has told Reuters that they will not reopen Hormuz in exchange for a temporary ceasefire, also warning that the Strait "will never return to its former status, especially for the US and Israel". Exiting the war without opening the Strait of Hormuz by force or through a deal would have been a major reputational blow to the reputation of the United States. There is just too much at stake: it is a critical lifeline

for the Gulf allies and a crucial global trade chokepoint. For all the posturing of Donald Trump, the conventional logic says that the United States will not simply abandon its Gulf allies and leave the strategic Strait of Hormuz in the hands of Iran, which most likely means a longer war. CONCLUSION The war in Iran has opened Pandora's box of bad or worse solutions. Whether the war ends in the near future or goes on for longer. Too much is at stake, and it feels like, as currently presented, all possible scenarios cause a lot of unpredictability and potential for chaos. Everything spells trouble.

The good news is that, as of April 6, Pakistan has been trying to broker a deal between the sides, but it is difficult to see how they will bridge such a massive gulf that caused the war in the first place. On April 7, Donald Trump threatened Iran with a social media message claiming that a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back,k and on April 8th, the sides announced that they have agreed on a ceasefire, but both Iran and the US have presented radically different frameworks for the ceasefire agreement. A few hours later, Israel carried out a strike against Lebanon, the biggest of this war so far,

which prompted Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz once again. On April 12, US Vice President Vance left Pakistan, stating that the negotiations did not lead to an agreement, which Trump followed by threatening Iran with a full naval blockade. All this shows that, although the ceasefire continues, there is significant potential for escalation and a prolonged war. We will talk about this war more in the coming weeks, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see it. Please consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely.

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