The Islamic revolution in Iran is one of the most consequential political upheavals of the 20th century. It gave rise to a truly unique political system and turned Iran into one of the biggest challengers to the Pax Americana. Much has been written about how the revolution unfolded and how Shia clerics came to power in one of the world's oldest countries. The joint attack of the United States and Israel on Iran has once again brought the Iranian revolution and its clerical regime to the spotlight, but we are not going to make a video on how the revolution happened. Instead,

we want to answer one question: "Why did the Iranian Revolution Happen?" POLITICAL CAUSES AND OPPRESSION Iran has had its fair share of disruptive and transformational political events in the 20th century. Revolutions, coups, foreign occupation, and the substitution of one royal family for another. The truth is that Iranian society has always been politically very active, and even during the harshest authoritarian periods, they

have found ways to express their dissent, often putting their lives at risk in the process. The Iran of the 1970s was one of the most oppressive regimes in the world. Ever since the US-sponsored 1953 coup, which toppled the democratically elected Mossadegh government, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had been curbing the political space and persecuting his opposition. One by one, political parties had been banned. In 1957, the Shah created SAVAK, the secret police, to protect his regime from dissent, which Time magazine described as "Iran's most hated and

feared institution". SAVAK routinely engaged in torture and execution of people suspected of opposing the Shah. This effectively turned Iran into an authoritarian police state, which pushed the opposition underground. By the mid-1970s, the Shah had become fully totalitarian. In 1975, he created the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party, whose sole purpose was to promote Mohammad Reza Shah's rule and implement his policies. Anyone disagreeing with him was branded a traitor by the Shah, who said: "The place of those who oppose the Constitution, the monarchical system

and the People-Shah Revolution is either in jail or outside Iran. Those who do not wish to enter into this political organization (the Rastakhiz) have two alternatives: They either belong to an illegal political party, like the Tudeh, in which case they should be jailed". [second part missing here?] The Shah himself admitted that there were 3000 political prisoners in the country in 1976. Foreign journalists and Iranian exile groups put the estimate from 25,000 to 100,000 political prisoners. So, the sheer scale of political oppression in Iran was unbearable. The Shah's reign of terror targeted many groups,

most notably Iranians with leftist or liberal sympathies. While repression against politically active people was perhaps deplored by the ordinary Iranians, it was nonetheless within the realms of what was expected. Iranian shahs were never really known for tolerance for dissent. But in hindsight, the Shah, increasingly blinded by arrogance, which can be caused only by excessive wealth and unfettered power, and seeing himself as some kind of reformist messiah of Iran, crossed some red lines he was not supposed to. He targeted Iran's notoriously independent merchant class,

the bazaar, which has been the center of life and commerce of Iranian cities for centuries. The mood of Iranian bazaars had often been a barometer of society at large, and when that mood soured, Iranian shopkeepers and merchants were often at the forefront of discontent and revolt. The bazaars had protested the Shah already twice before the revolution - once in 1954, striking against the new oil agreement with the West and the second time in 1963, when they took to the streets to speak out against rigged parliamentary elections. So, the Shah rightly saw the bazaars

as a source of threat to his increasingly totalitarian rule. But also, the bazaars were not part of his vision of a modernized future Iran, as he preferred big businessmen who largely depended on his goodwill. He wanted to bulldoze old bazaars and build state-run markets, new roads and modern restaurants in their stead. After creating Rastakhiz, Mohammad Reza started making moves to take control over the bazaars. His party opened local branches in the bazaars and replaced local merchant guilds with a Chamber of Guilds, appointing wealthy outsiders to its

presidency. While big businessmen borrowed money from banks at a reasonable 6 percent interest rate, small shopkeepers had to pay exorbitant rates, often exceeding 20%. When Iran was hit with spiralling inflation in 1975, the regime chose to target small shopkeepers as scapegoats and launched a major campaign against them. "The Bazaar profiteers" were accused of artificially increasing prices. Some 8,000 bazaar-related businessmen were jailed. 23,000 were exiled from their homes, and some 200,000 men were fined. Simultaneously, the Shah waged war against the

religious establishment. He believed that the crucial element of his drive for modernization was eliminating the Shia clergy's independence, which had been a major political force in Iran for centuries. A series of laws that contradicted the Sharia was passed. The minimum marriage age for girls was raised to 15 under the 1967 law, then to 18 under its 1975 amendment. The Family Protection Law of 1967 restricted polygamy and made the process of divorce more complicated for men. Female students wearing chador veils were prohibited from registering

at universities. The Islamic Hijri calendar was substituted with a new royalist calendar, as Iranians suddenly experienced an overnight transition from 1355 to 2535. The Religious Corps was established to ideologically challenge the traditional Shia clergy class and promote the Shah's version of Islam, which was proclaimed the "spiritual guide" of Iran. Many prominent clerical leaders, who criticized these new policies, were imprisoned. The future leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was sent into exile. By destroying the liberal and leftist opposition,

while also making strong moves against the religious and merchant classes, the Shah regime was driving the opposition deep underground. On the surface, the Iranian police state had weakened the opposition to the point of making it nearly invisible, but at a deeper level, the harshness of repressions turned the resentment against Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into pure hatred hidden from plain sight for the time being. But many authoritarian and totalitarian regimes engage in brutal political repression and continue existing despite them. So, although political repression is

an important motivator and cause of revolutionary movements, it is almost never sufficient to be the sole factor behind mass movements. Mohammad Reza Shah's modernisation programme was breathtaking in its ambition - he intended to transform Iranian society beyond recognition in an extremely short period of time. This is never an easy task and almost always requires an immense degree of legitimacy, popularity and control for rulers to realize their ambitions. Something not many leaders have ever enjoyed. Because radical

modernisation envisages taking on entrenched order and societal forces and centuries-long societal dynamics. The Shah's vision of modernization included eliminating the influence of traditional societal forces such as the Shia clergy and the merchant class. They were seen as remnants of the past. There would be no opposition to his rule, and he would surround himself with Western-educated technocrats, specialists, and large businessmen. Iran's massive oil revenue was going to fund the industrialization of the country, rapidly building up its infrastructure,

turning Iran into a military powerhouse, improving healthcare and education and emancipating women from the shackles of religion. Here, the problem for the Shah was that a significant portion of the Iranian population was conservative and rejected such a rapid transformation. On top of that, modernization in Iran was closely associated with Westernization. The United States, Britain and Israel were seen as the staunch allies of the Shah regime. And the religious, leftist and nationalist forces in Iran had many reasons to be critical of the West. An anti-Western attitude

was part of the Iranian psyche to some extent, as Iranians had long bemoaned the Western meddling in their affairs, taking over their resources and controlling their leaders as puppets. In 1890, the tobacco protests occurred after the Iranian government sold the tobacco concession to Britain. In 1953, the US and Britain orchestrated a coup to depose the democratically elected prime minister Mossadegh, who had previously decided to nationalize Iran's oil industry. Mohammed Reza Shah was friendly with Israel. All of these were legitimate causes for resentment against the

West in large portions of Iranian society. The former prime minister of Iran, Jamshid Amouzegar, argued that the collapse of the Shah regime was caused by a clash between Western modernization and traditional, religious, economic and social structures. Indeed, the anti-foreign sentiment is a common feature in many revolutions, and the Iranian revolution is no exception. URBANIZATION AND EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION One of the key elements of the Shah's modernization plan was rapid urbanization, the uncontrolled manner of which became one of the

causes of the revolution. The urban population of Iran increased from 6 million to 16 million between 1956 and 1976. At the same time, the rapid expansion of higher education, state bureaucracy and industry increased the number of jobs in cities. By the 1970s, there had been a fourfold increase in the number of university graduates - roughly 300,000 people. The number of people working as civil servants, teachers, engineers, managers, doctors, and other typical middle-class jobs rose from an estimated 324,000 to 630,000 by 1977. The urban working class is estimated to have grown from around 300k in 1953 to more than 1.7 million by 1977,

with the oil industry, factories, railways, and transportation companies as the largest employers. On the surface, this looks impressive and indicates a rapid transformation. But such progress also brought challenges that the Shah regime was ill-equipped to deal with. The oil boom caused a major construction boom in Iran. One of the unintended consequences was a major internal migration of the low-skilled rural population to the cities in search of jobs. Many struggled to get permanent employment. On top of that, the lack of adequate housing and

social services led to the emergence of new shantytowns. Poor socio-economic conditions, lack of prospects and youthful restlessness have always been a perfect combination for political unrest. But it also caused the proliferation of crime and vices like alcoholism and prostitution. This, in turn, handed the clergy powerful material for its anti-regime messaging. The Shah's modernization and westernization were blamed for immorality, a message which found some resonance among ordinary Iranians. Moreover, the newly urbanized people and the

increasingly young and educated population of Iran inevitably sought communities to identify with and for opportunities to rise in the social ladder. But the destruction of practically all independent organizations, such as political parties, labor unions and professional associations, meant that finding such communities and avenues to express themselves and convey grievances in a non-violent manner did not exist. One of the aims of Rastakhiz was to bring these young people into the fold, but it was belated, and the Shah's and his party's messages did not really appeal to this new social

stratum. Enter the only remaining independent institution, to which throughout history many have turned for the sense of community, comfort and hope - the clergy. For all the pressure the Shah was putting on institutionalized Shiism in Iran, it was still standing. In the absence of other options, thousands of urban migrants, especially those who had been left behind, sought financial and moral support from the clergy. This gave the religious opposition a significant young supporter base in big cities.

Yet, for all the progress Iran had made during the Shah's reign, thanks to a massive influx of oil money, the country still faced major socio-economic problems. On the eve of the revolution, 68% of adults were still illiterate, while fewer than 40% of children had completed primary school. 43% of urban families lived in one-room houses, on top of the shanty towns we mentioned earlier. Many cities, including Tehran, lacked proper sewage systems and public transportation. Although the government funded the formation of farm cooperatives and

provided some machinery to farmers, their overall agricultural strategy, as in many other spheres, was bafflingly incomplete and inconsistent. Most rural areas lacked electricity, and banks did not offer favourable loans to farm cooperatives to boost their productivity. On the opposite side of the spectrum, businessmen and bureaucrats close to the regime were enriching themselves thanks to preferential treatment and outright corruption. In 1974-75 alone, the Commander of the Iranian Navy and the Commander of the Air Force, the latter of

whom was Mohammad Reza's brother-in-law, were implicated in corruption. And the public saw that the very few were enriching themselves on their country's wealth at their expense, which only made their resentment worse. Many felt like modernization, and the Shah's policies served the purpose of making the rich richer, while ignoring the problems and interests of ordinary people. And this was the majority - one whose silence would not last much longer. THE REVOLUTION Up until now, we have focused on pre-existing structural causes that ignited the mass protest movement in Iran in 1978. But

similar causes had existed in many other countries with similar contexts without revolutions toppling the incumbents. So, what made the Iranian protest movement different? Iran's revolutionary history is unique in a sense. At least, in terms of tactics used by protesters. For instance, bast - people taking sanctuary in mosques, other holy places and foreign embassies in large numbers as a sign of protest, which was used in the 1906 revolution. But arguably the most impactful, uniquely Iranian mobilization tactic is called Chehelom, which means the "40th" in Persian.

In the Shia tradition, the dead are mourned for 40 days, with the final respects being given on the 40th day. As a revolutionary tactic, it meant gathering for the 40th day ceremony of a protester, who had been previously killed by the regime. Then this gathering would transform into a protest of its own. And it became a self-sustaining wave of protest across Iran during the 1978-79 revolution. The revolutionary cycle began with the Qom protests and the government's bloody response, which killed at least 5 people. 40 days later, Tabriz rose up in Chehelom with

bazaars and mosques playing a crucial role in mobilizing the people. The regime once again responded by killing several protesters. Then, 40 days later, on March 29, protests took place in dozens of Iranian cities, including the capital, Tehran. This cycle continued through the summer and then the shocking events like the Cinema Rex fire and the Jaleh Square massacre turned the wave of protests into a truly revolutionary mass movement. Without a doubt, the Chehelom tradition was an important element of this. Scholars of the Iranian revolution also

point out the inconsistency of the regime's decision-making - sometimes too heavy-handed, other times hesitant in the face of the growing revolutionary movement and unrest. At the initial stage of the mass movement, the Shah cracked down very hard on the protests in Qom. This reaction was expected for an authoritarian regime, but the death of protesters launched the cycle of Chehelom, growing the movement and expanding the geography of demonstrations. The brutality of his regime peaked at the Jaleh Square massacre, with more than 100 casualties reported on both sides,

mostly among the civilians. This is when the situation reached the point of no return. The only chance of saving his power for the Shah was to continue relying on excessive violence to defeat the revolution. Instead, Mohammad Reza suddenly changed his strategy and tried to appease the opposition by dismissing his government, releasing political prisoners, easing censorship and promising free elections to the parliament in 1979. This step could have been a viable option for maintaining his power, while gradually moving towards a constitutional

monarchy, at the start of the protests. After the Jaleh Square massacre, this move was seen as a sign of weakness by the Shah, who was quickly losing any popularity he had. In November, Mohammad Reza Shah declared that he had "heard the voice of revolution" and ordered the army to constrain its reaction. But around the same time, he appointed a military government led by General Azhari, who tried to restore order through curfews and strict enforcement of martial law. However, mass strikes in the oil sector and defections from the regime during this period demonstrated that

it was likely beyond saving. The appointment of a moderate opposition figure, Shapour Bakhtiar, as prime minister in January 1979 was a very late and unsuccessful attempt to appease the public. Like many authoritarian leaders before and after, the Shah decided to disperse protests through force. But the army was ill-equipped to effectively contain the protests, because they relied excessively on live ammunition, since they did not have other means of crowd control, nor training in this very specific task. Shah's contradictory orders didn't help. The scale of

killing of the people by the regime and standalone shocking events like the Cinema Rex fire, which the Shia establishment very masterfully used for its advantage by blaming the Shah, had made the revolution too powerful and the regime absent of answers and solutions. We will talk about Iran and the current situation in future videos. If you don't want to miss those videos, make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see them. Please consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Recently, we

have started releasing weekly patron and YouTube member exclusive content, consider joining their ranks via the link in the description or button under the video to watch these weekly videos, learn about our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our private discord, and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one