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This is the Bella 1, a massive tanker morowed off the coast of Scotland in early January 2026. Once flying under the Guyana flag, the vessel has been renamed and reflagged multiple times, most recently as Mariner, with ownership deliberately shifting to evade sanctions and scrutiny. That's because it's a key player in Russia's shadow fleet. This is an aging and opaque armada of ships that now moves roughly 2/3 of Russia's seaborn oil exports. a critical lifeline funding Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. US authorities recently intercepted the Bella 1 in a highstakes game of cat and mouse that involved months of tracking by satellites, patrols, and intelligence teams, logging
every course change and port call. All with the aim of choking off a vital cash that Russia needs to fund its war effort. We explore Russia's shadow fleet, tankers that keep billions in oil flowing, dodge sanctions, and directly fuel the war in Ukraine. In this episode of photo evidence, after Russia invaded Ukraine, billions in oil revenue were suddenly at risk. In December 2022, the European Union slapped a ban on Russian seaborn oil with the aim of cutting vital Kremlin revenue that it needs to fight the war. At the same time, the G7 rolled out a price cap. This stops Western shipping and insurance firms from touching cargos above $60 per barrel, avoiding the inevitable price shock of cutting the
oil off entirely. but still hurting Russia. The graph shows the result. Russia's daily oil revenues spiked in 2022 before the sanctions kicked in, then declined from 2023 through to 2025 as they took effect. Enter the Shadow Fleet, a sprawling secretive network of tankers, moving billions of dollars in oil off the grid and therefore outside the reach of sanctions enforcement. Some form of Shadow Fleet has been in existence for decades under the operations of Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. But it is Russia that has changed the game in terms of scale and complexity. The global shadow fleet now consists of roughly 1,500 tankers, almost all of which are thought to be operating on behalf of Russia. Many of
these ships hide their true owners behind opaque shell companies, masking who ultimately controls the cargo. So, how does Russia use this fleet to get around sanctions? Ships change names, flags, and management repeatedly, breaking paper trails, and keeping authorities guessing. Under international law, a vessel must sail under the flag of a state and that state is responsible for enforcing safety, inspections, and sanctions compliance. By reflging, a tanker shifts the country legally responsible for overseeing it. In this case, the Iranian oil tanker Grace One is seen under the Panama flag in July 2019. And then 1 month later, the same tanker has been renamed under
the Iranian flag. If you look closely here, you can see that the Grace One has been painted over and renamed. When regulators dregister a sanctioned vessel, it can often secure a new flag within days, sometimes through open registries that require little scrutiny of ownership or history. Another loophole is insurance. Tankers need valid cover to enter ports and access services. Dubious or shell insurers provide paperwork that keeps sanctioned ships moving and shifts the risk to coastal states if something goes wrong. Some tanker operators lie to insurers about routes and cargo to obtain coverage for sanctioned shipments. Then we have manipulation of tracking data.
Russia's shadow fleet exploits AIS, which stands for automatic identification system. Ships should send out location signals which allows other vessels to see where they are for safety. But some shadow tankers switch this tracker off, disappearing from public maps. Others manipulate AIS by broadcasting false positions, sometimes hundreds of kilometers from their real location, a tactic known as spoofing. Here is what spoofing can look like. The pink vessel moves in a circle, the yellow vessel is stationary, and the green vessel appears to be moving back and forth in a straight line. AIS was designed mainly to avoid collisions, not
sanctions enforcement, and that gap is being exploited. In short, the Shadow Fleet exists because Western sanctions cut off Russia's traditional oil channels, and Moscow still needs billions to fund its war. These ships are the loophole that keeps the money flowing. Analysts estimate that 65 to 70% of Russia's seaborn oil exports now move through these vessels. Here's how the Shadow Fleet works in practice. Russian crude leaves the Baltic or sometimes the Black Sea and heads to a rendev viewpoint in the Mediterranean such as the Laconian Gulf here. At these meeting points, two tankers align side by side like the Liberian flagged ice
energy and Russian flagged Lana here just off the shore of Kistos on the island of Evia. Oil is then pumped from one vessel to another. By moving oil between vessels at sea, the cargo's trail is obscured, making it difficult for authorities to trace its Russian origin and enforce sanctions. But it's not just a physical move. It's a paperwork shuffle, too. The receiving tanker might be under a completely different company and insured by someone else entirely. Two different shipments of crude oil may also be blended together. Blending breaks the paper trail and mixes sanctioned Russian oil with other sources, making it almost impossible to tell where any of the oil
originated. From there, the oil heads to onshore refineries located in countries friendly to Russia. The largest flows head to China, which as of late 2025 accounts for about 47% of Russian crude exports, and India at roughly 38%. Smaller volumes reach Turkey around 6% and the European Union also about 6%. With additional shipments reported to Syria and other harder to track destinations. Once oil reaches a refinery, it can be transformed into diesel or other products. For example, Russian crude processed in India becomes legally Indian diesel. This diesel can then be exported to Europe, bypassing sanctions without technically breaking the rules. In some cases, Saudi Arabia even imports Russian diesel, freeing its
own supply for Europe. In the past year, this fleet has moved millions of barrels per day out of Russia's ports. Let's go back to a ship that changed names faster than authorities could track it. The Mariner or Bella 1. The Bella 1 is a 300 m very large crude carrier built in 2002, capable of carrying up to 2 million barrels of crude oil in a single voyage. It appeared under Guyana's flag. A registration later reported to be false. It later ref flagged again, this time to Russia. AIS data in September 2025 showed the vessel near the straight of Hermuse between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aman. But satellite imagery
placed it more than 700 km away at Iran's K Island export terminal. It wasn't just going dark, it was spoofing its location, broadcasting a false position while loading crude elsewhere. By late December 2025, the vessel appeared in the Russian maritime registry under a new identity, Mariner. Control had shifted to a newly formed Russian company. Then in early January 2026, after months of tracking that combined AIS and satellite imagery, US forces moved in. They boarded and seized the tanker. Over the past 6 months, more than a dozen heavily sanctioned tankers have shifted from open registries such as Panama, Liberia, or Gabon to the Russian flag. This trend intensified in
December, as flying the Russian flag served as a shield against potential seizure. Two recent examples include Hyperion, which left Venezuelan waters on January the 1st, 2025 under the Russian flag, and Premier, which ref flagged from Gambia to Russia while still in Venezuelan waters. Both were already sanctioned by the US, EU, UK, Canada, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Refflagging doesn't make these ships legal. It makes them harder to confront. Under Russia's flag, any interception risks diplomatic escalation. Under international law, every ship must sail under the flag of state to enjoy freedom of navigation. That state assumes responsibility for the vessel's safety,
labor conditions, pollution controls, and legal compliance. Many countries such as Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands, the three largest registries in the world, operate open registries, often requiring limited ownership checks, perfect for quick refl. Less transparent registries, like Abon lack effective checks entirely. This was evident with several Russian state-owned suffers after being dregistered by Liberia. They quickly reflate UAE based company. When enforcement under one flag fails, vessels may hop repeatedly, masking ownership and accountability. We see here a certificate of registration from St.
Martin, a small island in the Caribbean. But this document was produced by a private company fraudulently claiming to run the island's ship registry and was ultimately sanctioned by the EU in October 2025. Other vessels also claimed registration with countries that never authorized them, creating stateless vessels, which can be boarded only after complex legal coordination. Insurance is another tool keeping these tankers moving. Due to sanctions pressure, dubious or shell insurers are emerging to issue documents that appear legitimate, allowing ships to dock and load cargo despite restrictions. For example, Rorowarine, a purported insurer, claimed to cover dozens of Russian shadow fleet tankers. Norwegian
authorities later confirmed it was never licensed, and many certificates were forged, listing reinsurers who later denied involvement. A screenshot from Rorow Marine's website shows a tanker Ionia listed as insured, whilst forged documents featured false letterheads and stamps. Controlled by Russian national Andre Mudulin, the company operated from a website registered in Russia despite its supposed Norwegian registration. Another company, New Zealand based insured Maritime Mutual is now under investigation. It ensured tens of billions of dollars worth of Russian and Iranian oil, including sanctioned vessels such as the Feng Huang, formerly Fenix1, which was sanctioned by
Washington in February 2025. Just a week later, Russian port data showed it declaring maritime mutual insurance. On paper, policies were backed by major reinsurers. In practice, they enabled sanctioned ships to dock worldwide and facilitate Russian oil exports. Sanctions were meant to isolate Russia, but they created a new ecosystem of intermediaries. Dubai, once a regional trading hub, has become a hub for smaller privately held trading houses stepping in after Western firms exited Russian oil markets. Each cargo can earn tens of millions of dollars, and hundreds of voyages can quickly multiply the sums. Immediately after the 2022 sanctions, Russian oil revenues fell sharply, but alternative shipping,
insurance, and trading channels allowed income to recover. While estimates vary, analysis suggests Russia has lost over 100 billion dollars in potential oil and gas revenue since the invasion. Despite sanctions and price caps, Russia remains one of the world's largest energy exporters. The Shadow Fleet doesn't only move Russian crude. Many of these same tankers also carry sanctioned oil from Iran and Venezuela. For countries like Iran and Venezuela, Shadowfleet exports are more than just oil sales. The revenue keeps their economies afloat, funds state budgets, stabilizes currencies, and sustains security forces and political patronage networks. Even discounted crude generates billions in hard currency that would otherwise be
cut off by sanctions. Current efforts by the US to enforce maritime blockades on Venezuela and Iran with several seizures of tankers in January highlight the mounting efforts to counter shadow fleet operations. Stopping a shadow fleet vessel collides with international law and logistics. NATO cannot board commercial vessels on the high seas and the European Union has no unified coast guard to enforce sanctions globally. Under maritime law, a vessel falls under its flag states jurisdiction, making boarding foreign flag tankers complex, diplomatically sensitive, and often requiring court approval, and courts don't always agree. The global flag
registry system complicates enforcement further. Legal and commercial incentives mean vessels struck from one registry often reappear under another, sometimes with weaker oversight, such as Cabon. Some coordination exists. The NBA++ coalition gathers the coastal states sitting along the geographic route that Russia shadow fleet follows. The Nordics, Baltics, Poland, Germany, Netherlands, France, and the UK. The NB8 plus countries scrutinize high-risisk vessels along choke points like the Gulf of Finland and Danish Straits, demanding proof of credible insurance. Without it, a tanker may face inspection, delay, or denial of passage. Despite coordination efforts, countries still struggle to
ensure real-time sharing of sanctions data. And when the enforcement is attempted, it can quickly escalate. In May 2025, Estonia tried to intercept the Gabon flag tanker Jaguar, part of Russia's shadow fleet near Primorsque. Stonian patrol vessels, aircraft, and helicopters were deployed, but Russia scrambled an SU35 fighter to escort the tanker. The Jaguar ignored requests to change course and later anchored near Kland Island. Highprofile interdictions like the US boarding of Marinara show the political weight involved. Seizing a stateless vessel is one thing. Boarding a tanker registered to a major power risks diplomatic escalation or worse.
These vessels aren't just evasive. They're old and deteriorating. Most Shadowfleet tankers have long passed the age when ships exit mainstream service, raising serious safety concerns, especially in narrow or busy waters. In northern Europe, aging tankers transit the Baltic Sea and Danish straits daily, carrying crude and refined products past densely populated coastlines. Denmark and other coastal states have tightened environmental inspections because a catastrophic spill is widely seen by experts as only a matter of time. Many vessels lack valid insurance or rely on dubious coverage. A spill wouldn't just affect shipping companies. It could leave taxpayers dealing with a cleanup
and ecological damage. These risks aren't just environmental. Poorly documented vessels, insensitive waterways open the door to espionage, sabotage, and attacks on infrastructure like Anders cables. GPS spoofing, falsified tracking, and military encounters showed this ships operate in a gray zone between commerce and conflict, making them tools of an evolving hybrid threat. The Mariner was seized, but Russia's shadow fleet remains at sea. As long as the global oil market depends on Russian crude, ships like this will keep sailing, repainting, refling, and reinventing themselves faster than the law can keep up. Each cargo carries
revenue that helps finance Moscow's war in Ukraine. And as long as those tankers keep moving, the Kremlin's most important source of cash keeps flowing beyond the reach of traditional sanctions.
