US Weapons Delays to Europe Widen Transatlantic Rift Amid Shifting Priorities

The growing rift between the US and EU is getting hard to ignore. Their defense alliance is built on trust. But now the Trump administration is fasttracking billions of dollars in emergency weapons sales to allies in the Middle East while European partners have to wait. Security services across Europe warn Russia is rebuilding its military and could be ready for conflict with Europe by 2029. Some experts believe China could have a worldclass force by next year. Does that make America squeam? This all makes me wonder what are the US's priorities?

Steven Biddle can tell us. He's a professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University. But Stephen, first let's take a look together at the news because the Financial Times published the story this weekend with the headline, "US warns Europe of delays to arm shipments as Iran war drains stockpiles." It says Washington has warned European allies including the UK, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia to expect long delivery delays for US weapons. And look at these deals. The US is fasttracking to its allies in the Middle East worth over $8.5 billion. Qatar is the biggest beneficiary you see there, followed by Kuwait. Then there's Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

The Pentagon told the Financial Times it was carefully evaluating new requests for equipment from partners as well as existing arms transfer cases to ensure alignment with operational needs. It declined to provide details, citing the operationally sensitive nature of these matters. Stephen, how unusual is this US weapons deal with Middle Eastern allies approved using emergency powers? I should point out, yeah, there's nothing particularly unusual about US weapon sales to the Persian Gulf. We've been the biggest supplier of weaponry to the Gulf for over 50 years. What's unusual is one the emergency designation uh which enables the Trump administration to circumvent legislative oversight. Uh they that's not unusual for the Trump

administration. They do this on lots of issues, but this is the first time they've done it on weapon sales to my knowledge. The second thing that's unusual about this is that it involves a serious cost to American readiness or our own defense using our own military and it involves a serious uh effect on our ability to support allies anywhere else and especially uh Europe and especially Ukraine. These are new features. Um, the idea that we're selling weapons to the Persian Gulf isn't. What does invoking an emergency tell us though about how Washington views the situation after the Iran war? Yeah, I think actually it tells us less about how they view Iran and more about how they view the US Congress.

Uh I don't think this reflects some assessment that this is a unique emergency in any objective, reasonable, realistic sense. I think what this is the latest use of a tactic that the Trump administration's used in all sorts of policy domains as a way of escaping oversight. This has been central to their tariff policies, for example. It's been central to their policies on border security. Um, I don't think any of it reflects any objective sense that any of these situations are emergencies that would require unusual speed of policym. I think what it represents is a recognition that they've discovered that if they pull the emergency card out and play it, they get to do what they

want and the Congress doesn't constrain them. Mhm. Now, you know, the courts are increasingly skeptical of this tactic. Uh but they're they continue to use it and until the courts stop it, they're going to use it more. Okay, let's go to uh a sound bite from Trump because despite these reports that uh strategic US weapons stock piles are under strain, he has sought to reassure Americans that the United States is not running low on key munitions despite weeks of conflicts in Iran. No, no. We have more than we've ever had actually because all over the world we have inventory and we can take that if we need it. But all over the world we have tremendous amounts of inventory.

The best. For instance, we're stocked and locked and loaded. Right now we have more than double what we had when this started. Is the US running out of weapons? That depends on how you define it. If it means or do we not have enough weapons to fight the war in Iran, the answer is no. We have enough for that. The problem is the rate of usage in Iran is making it substantially less likely that the US has enough weapons to deal with a potential war with the People's Republic of China and that the United States has enough weapons to deal with a threat from the

PRC and support our European allies. uh the it's it's the number of different stresses on the US arsenal that's creating the problem here or Iran per se, a middle ranking regional power, not the PRC, not Russia. Yes, we have enough. Uh the trouble is we're using so many against this middle ranking regional power in the Middle East that the insufficiency is for everything else we have to worry about. Well, let's talk strategy then for a moment because in the press releases the State Department issued for all these deals with its uh Middle Eastern allies, there's a sentence repeated each time. this proposed sale will contribute to

the foreign policy and national security of the United States. Stephen, can you expand on that? Uh, well, the president interprets the national security of the United States to be whatever foreign policy priority he has at time t. He's decided, notwithstanding his own national security strategy, that it's all of a sudden critically essential to US national security to wage a war against Iran. I mean, it if you read his own national security strategy, you would find this a surprising finding. Um, so I don't think this so much represents some deep rethink of America's interests in the world. I think what this represents is the Trump administration decided that it had an opportunity in Iran in the form of a weakened

opponent that they would like to make substantially weaker still and they thought they could do it quickly and easily at low cost especially after the adventure in Venezuela turned out in the short term pretty well for them. Um, I I don't think this represents, you know, some realignment of American foreign policy. The realignment of American foreign policy arguably came about when the Trump administration took office before they decided to wage war on Iran. when they significantly changed US priorities to deemphasize Europe, deemphasize Russia, continue to emphasize the PRC in the Pacific, but then to create this wholly new emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, which hadn't been a focus of US foreign policy in generations.

Um th those things are new. Now whether they will continue is another matter. I mean the war in Iran is sucking the oxygen out of the rest of US national security policy. It's consuming munitions that we now don't have to deter other opponents elsewhere. It's consuming munitions we don't have to support allies elsewhere. it's occupying the foreign policy bandwidth of the rather limited number of people that Trump trusts to have any meaningful role in the development of policy. Um, and because there's no obvious end to the Iran war anytime soon, uh, the likelihood that it will continue having this kind of gravitational effect, uh, just kind of drawing all of the attention and all of the emphasis out of the US government's ability to think

about foreign policy, um, may go on for a while. Okay. Well, while that's happening, what would you say the US's strategic priorities are right now? I think the strategic priority at the moment is to try and find some way to get out of the culde-sac they've driven themselves into in Iran uh without a catastrophic result in the American midterm elections. my sense about what the foreign policy echelons in the Trump administration are actually thinking about or worrying about is that's you know preclusive of almost everything else. Uh I don't think they expected this to become this big thundering problem for them. I thought

they thought this was going to be quick and easy. um now that it isn't that it's forcing you all sorts of complicated trade-offs like for example using munitions that would be better reserved for the Pacific to wage a war that we didn't really need to wage and wasn't particularly part of US national security strategy anyway. Um, so I think that the war in Iran is the overwhelming focus. Uh, and everything else ends up being interpreted through that lens. So you take for example US policy towards NATO, right? The dust up uh with Germany uh doesn't appear to be the result of some particular immediate change in the

Trump administration's attitude towards NATO. They've never particularly liked NATO. Um, and there obviously been all sorts of tensions since they took office. But I think this immediate dust up isn't because the Trump administration said, "Oh, we need we think differently about NATO now." It's because of Iran. They want assistance in getting themselves out of the mess they've created. They're not getting it. And hence they're angry at people that they think should be pulling this rabbit out of a hat for them and saving them from their own problem and won't do it. So now they're angry at the various people who aren't bailing them out. So is US defense capability stretched across too many theaters right now?

Oh, absolutely. I mean you and again this like so much of the rest is an own goal, right? The US military would be sufficient together with NATO to deal with the Russian threat and together with our Pacific allies to deal with the PRC threat. But then you know we suddenly decided that Latin America is a major US national security focus. We then alienated all of the allies that would help us in dealing with the Russia problem in Europe and help us in dealing with the PRC problem in the Western Pacific. And lo and behold, if we're going to do this all by ourselves and we're going to start a war of choice in the Middle East and, you know, topple various governments in Latin America, you will Venezuela be the end? Who

knows? um and redeploy the military to the southern border and treat that as a national security issue. I mean it no it not even you know a sole superpower can do everything simultaneously that there are always limits and this administration doesn't seem to be able to make choices and say we're going to focus on the things that really matter and not do all of this secondary stuff. They seem to think that we're omnipotent and can do everything everywhere all at the same time. And we can't. Let's bring it back to Europe for a second. Some leaders are calling for calm over these reports of weapons delays and the shifting priorities of the US. Finland and Estonia are frontline states on Europe's border with Russia. Presidents Alexander

S and Alakarees responded to reports their nations may be coming up short when it comes to the prioritization of US weapons deliveries because of the global situation. In other words, the war in Iran. Uh it is a public secret that some of the stocks uh and delivery systems in the US are either going elsewhere or being uh delayed. But I don't see any need for alarm. I know that there is a delay. It's probably a question to our minister of defense what kind of uh missiles or ammunition we are missing but as far as I know it's himers but gives a signal that in uh in Estonia and in Europe in general we should much faster develop our defense industry not relying on different um different countries in the world. So Stephen, is Europe being deprioritized or being

pushed to take more responsibility? Well, I think both those two things go together. Um, yeah, and certainly in terms of the bigger picture from Europe, um, as long as there's a reasonable chance that a MAGA Republican will be in charge in the United States, um, Europe has got to step up. We're just not going to be reliable in ways that I wish that we had been and that I wish we would continue to be. But you don't think it could be a longer term shift? Well, I mean, the longer term depends very much on the future of the mega Republican party in the United States. I mean, NATO remains popular among American voters, but there's increasingly a partisan divide. North of 80% of Democrats support NATO. Fewer

than 40% of Republicans support NATO. So yeah, if mega Republicanism somehow burnt itself out, I mean, the attitude of the American people as a whole is not dramatically different than it was prior to Trump. But when the US political system allows mega republicanism to win national elections and control foreign policy, then NATO is never going to be a priority. Uh the US is not a reliable uh source of assistance if push comes to shove. Um none of that means that the American public don't value transatlantic relations and the NATO alliance anymore. It means that mega Republicans don't, but they're running the country right now and they could run the country again. And if I were in Europe, I would take seriously the

prospect that this view, whether it's the America, whether it's the majority view in the United States or not, could shape US policy and Europe needs to hedge against that. You mentioned relations with Germany. uh this news of troop withdrawals uh this week. H how do troop reductions and weapons strain affect deterrence in Europe? Well, I mean I think deterrence in Europe was on the ropes uh before this was announced. Um I mean this announcement in itself doesn't change all that much. It's what 15%ish of the US troop presence in Germany and it was intended primarily as a thumb in

the eye to you know the German chancellor. Um, so the if I were Vladimir Putin, heaven forbid, I'd be looking at this in the larger context that mega republicanism has moved away from the support of Europe and away from the defense of Ukraine. And President Trump, heaven knows, has done those things. And this wouldn't be telling me, wow, they're pulling 5,000 troops out of Germany now. I can safely do what I wanted to do. Whereas before, on the other hand, I had to worry about the Americans bailing out NATO. I mean, I this is one more change at the edge of a series of changes since Trump came into office that have all kind of pointed in mostly in the same direction of diminishing US credibility as an ally in NATO Europe.

You brought up China uh earlier. Let's focus in on Asia for a moment. There are also signals that weapons deliveries to the Indoacific could be delayed. H how significant is that? And how does this affect deterrence in that region, especially when it comes to China and Taiwan? Yeah, I think this is very significant. Again, I think we have enough weapons to fight the Iranians. I'm not convinced that with all the weapons we've spent on the Iranians that we have enough weapons to defend Taiwan if it came to it. Um, now, you know, for the PRC to launch a war against Taiwan is a truly monumental decision. The potential consequences of that, you are, you know, cataclysmic for everyone involved. So I would like to think

that the sheer gravity of this kind of decision would weigh on she and that hopefully deterrence is reasonably robust just given the gravity of the war that would result if they pulled the trigger here. That said, the business of those of us in the national security community is to take low probability events like invasions and make them lower probability. And I don't think the US war in Iran has done that. And I if for those who believe that uh she is opportunistic and thinks he needs to act against Taiwan quickly before the US and the Taiwanese build capabilities to respond. Certainly the draw down in munitions that we've suffered as a result of the Iran war is an item of serious concern.

Um, I think deterrence would be more robust if we hadn't spent a significant fraction of our precision munition inventory uh and war against the middle ranking power in the Middle East. Stephen, could you explain a bit more about how Washington balances competing demands between Europe, the Middle East, the Indoacific without weakening its position overall in Asia? Well, I mean, the way the administration said it was going to do it when they took office, uh, was we were going to rely on the Europeans stepping up with American assistance, with American enablers, with American intelligence and political and

diplomatic support, but we were going to rely on the Europeans stepping up and to deal with the Russian threat. and the predominant weight of US military power would be directed at dealing with the China threat. Um that's not the way it's gone down. Uh again, none of that says let's go start a big war in the Middle East and expand half of our precision ordinance there. That wasn't part of the plan. Um, now, you know, as far as that goes, the Trump administration aren't the first people to suffer this phenomenon. the Obama administration was the first to announce a pivot to Asia in which the United States was going to stop getting bogged down in these you forever wars as they like to call them in the Middle East uh

and reorient out of the Middle East and toward East Asia and our Pacific alliance system. The Obama administration didn't have the kind of anti-NATO you know, chapo that this administration does, but they too wanted to shift to the Pacific and they didn't do it. The budget didn't change. Troop deployments didn't change. It appears to be harder for the United States to shift out of the Middle East than most strategists think would be advisable. Um, even if you support a strong transatlantic tie and a strong US contribution to NATO, as I do, for whatever that's worth, um, you can accommodate that to a significant degree while detering the PRC if you're not waging wars of choice in other places,

be they the Middle East or be they Latin America or be they Greenland or wherever else. So the Trump administration could be capable of juggling more than just one ball. Well, I mean any American administration with the you know economic and military power the United States has. We can cope with more than one theater, but that doesn't mean you can cope with everything simultaneously everywhere. I mean, you know, strategy is about making choices. It's not about doing everything at the same time. If you try that, you end up being short somewhere and potentially a lot of somewhere quite plaus quite plausibly Asia and Europe.

Could you sum things up for us though? If people are listening in and thinking, you know, this is I is this just a temporary crunch? Is this just the MAGA movement or is this the start of a more permanent shift in US global strategy? What's what's your take there? Um I think so much of this depends on where American domestic politics goes in the post Trump era. So I there will be no change on any of these scores while Trump is in office. Um, after Trump leaves office, there will be a struggle for the control of the Republican party and there will be an issue about whether the Republican party can win the White House and continue to, you know, govern the United States in

conjunction with the Congress. Um, and I would hope that you the non-magga Republicans, the few that are left and Democrats would recognize that the broader American public continues to support NATO, continues to support our alliances generally, continues to be deeply skeptical of the Russians, and continues to support Ukraine. and would, you know, configure American strategy in a way that would be supportive of those values that the public at large continues to hold. The the problem of course from Europe is how confident can you afford to be that's how American politics will evolve domestically? I mean, young Americans, even Democrats, tend to have different political views than old dinosaurs like me. Um, and at

the margin tend to be less supportive of NATO than, you know, older Americans of, you know, whichever party. But I think a central challenge of political leadership, you know, domestically in the United States as in everywhere else is leading on values that the leader thinks are important and that the public has, you know, sympathy for and can be led on. And you know, I would very much like post Trump American domestic politics to, you know, return to the kind of commitment to allies, commitment to Europe, opposition to aggression, you, you know, support of norms of decent international behavior that had been characteristic of the United States since World War II. to and before. But Stephen, that's something you like.

What can Europeans expect? Can Europe still rely on the US for weapons? Um or does Europe have to compete for US support? Well, I think Europe has to hedge its bets against the possibility that the US won't support it. I competing for US support. I mean, it if you want to get into a bidding war for Donald Trump's favors, that's a I in my view, that's a losing game, right? He'll he'll up the Andy to squeeze anyone for as much as they can be squeezed for. Um I, as an American, I would like American policy to move in a more traditional direction. If I were a European, I would not be I

would not be willing to assume that I would be hedging my bets. I would be building my defense industrial base. I would be reconstructing my military capabilities. I would be leading European publics to an increased understanding of the need for Europe to make its own way in the world and provide for its own security. If it then turns out that maggot Trumpism dies without the charismatic leader of Donald Trump and the United States returns to a more traditional role, then that's great. Then you have a truly robust deterrent. But I if I were a German, I would not be willing to bet my security on that. I would hedge because I don't think it can be assumed.

We'll leave it on that note. Stephen Bidd, thank you very much for talking to us uh from Colombia University. It's been a pleasure. Thanks for having me. And what do you think? Can Europe rely on the US for weapons? Let us know in the comments. I'm Ben Fazulan. I'll see you again soon.