The Bloody Winter Battles of 1915 on the Eastern Front

By early 1915, the Eastern Front ran on a line that left part of East Prussia and much of Galicia in Russian hands, while the Central Powers occupied part of Russian Poland. The biggest problem facing the Central Powers was the Russian threat to Austria-Hungary. Russian forces surrounded the huge Austro-Hungarian fortress at Przemysl in September 1914, and Vienna was desperate to relieve the siege and rescue the garrison. The fortress was meant to protect access to the vulnerable Hungarian plain, but now Russian troops in the Carpathian mountains threatened to break out and deal a crushing blow to the Habsburg army.

But Russian commanders were divided. General Ruszky wanted to strike against Germany in East Prussia or Silesia, while General Ivanov wanted to attack Austria-Hungary in the Carpathians. Still others, like General Aleksei Brusilov, worried the army had been weakened by the heavy losses of 1914 and new conscripts were poorly trained. At Stavka, the Russian headquarters, Grand Duke Nikolai solved the dispute by allowing preparations for attacks by the Northwest Front and the Southwest Front. Meanwhile the Germans and Austrians also argued. Austrian Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf insisted on relieving

Przemysl at any price. German overall commander Erich Falkenhayn wanted to attack in the West, but influential Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff wanted to attack in the East. An eastern offensive could restore the Vienna's prestige and might prevent neutral Italy, Romania or Bulgaria from joining the war against Austria. But the Habsburg army had suffered crippling losses in 1914, especially in the officer corps. Fearing a Habsburg collapse, Falkenhayn reluctantly agreed to an offensive in East Prussia and Conrad went ahead with his Carpathians plan.

So the Russians, Germans, and Austrians all planned offensives in the East for early 1915, and it was the Habsburg army that struck first. Conrad was in a hurry, since Przemysl could not hold out for long and was over 100km behind the front. Garrison commander Hermann Kusmanek had 130,000 men under his command, alongside about 30,000 civilians trapped in the city, and food would soon run short. Conrad's relief plan relied on German help and wishful thinking. The main attack would come from the 3rd Austro-Hungarian under Svetozar Boroevic and the new German-Austrian Southern Army,

under German general Alexander von Linsingen. They would first capture the mountain passes and a vital rail hub, before advancing on Przemysl. Two other Austro-Hungarian formations would launch supporting attacks on the flanks. The plan was very similar to that which failed in the Austro-Hungarian offensive of December 1914. But now the weakness of the army, the difficult terrain, winter conditions, inadequate railways, and a shortage of artillery were made worse by the fact that they barely outnumbered the Russians. Ivanov's Southwest

Front also had the advantage of better artillery and better rail connections for supply, though in places the Russian lines were thinly-manned. The Austro-Hungarians struck on January 23. 3rd Army troops forced themselves through the snow and ice towards Russian lines, making no progress in some places but pushing the Russians back up to 15km in others. They even took the Uszok and Wyszkow passes. The Southern Army also made some limited advances, but conditions were impossible. Soldiers dug holes in the deep snow for shelter from the cold, and thousands perished from

exposure or suffered frostbite. Austro-Hungarian Colonel Georg Veith recalled the suffering: "Hundreds froze to death every day. Every wounded man who couldn't drag himself along is left to die. […] Entire skirmishing lines of men surrender in tears to escape the agony; in the 21st Rifle Regiment the men manning the frontline trench […] were found frozen to the last man in the morning. No wagon, no beast of burden can advance in the monstrous masses of snow. The men must carry the food up to the front lines themselves, but the porters collapse and

freeze. Fighters go days without food in -25C." (Österreichisches Bundesministerium 142-143) Within days, the Austro-Hungarian advanced came to a stop. Ivanov argued now was the time to strike the spent Habsburg 3rd Army, despite Stavka's earlier decision for a more conservative posture in the southwest. On February 2, the Russians counterattacked and recaptured most of the lost ground, including the Lupkow pass, and the rail junction. Brusilov later wrote about the battle in his very patriotic memoirs: "In winter, in the mountains, to the waist in

the snow, in the cold and blizzard […] almost without ammunition and projectiles, fighting back with bayonet attacks, without artillery preparation, saving every shot, Russian soldiers fought heroically. […] I admired these heroes who endured the horrific severity of the mountain war in winter." (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library) Conrad was desperate, and ordered the 4th Army to attack on the flank. But Conrad had recently stripped 4th Army of many of its best units to give them to 3rd Army for the offensive, so it also went nowhere. On the southeastern flank,

the Pflanzer-Baltin Group also launched its supporting attack. Here, Russian forces were weaker, and the border with neutral Romania complicated their position. Austro-Hungarian forces made good progress, trapping some Russians against the border, recapturing Czernowitz, and taking Stanislau by February 20. But this Habsburg success far from the heart of the battle changed little in the mountains - there, the Russians came to a halt because of the snow, terrain, and exhaustion. Of the 165,000 Austro-Hungarian troops involved the action, 90,000 had become casualties within two weeks. (Stone 141)

So the Austro-Hungarians' gamble to relieve Przemysl had failed. But just as their forces were being thrown back in the Carpathians, the Germans sprang into action in the north. The Germans first launched a limited attack in Russian Poland around Bolimov, using xylyl bromide in gas shells. But the largest chemical attack of the war so far had little effect on the Russian troops due to the cold, and the Germans soon gave up their limited gains. In the Masurian Lakes area, the Germans concentrated 250,000 men to face the 150,000 Russians for the main

attack. The German plan was for their 10th and 8th Armies to surround and destroy the Russian 10th Army. Russian positions were prepared for their coming offensive, not defense, and often ran through exposed ground and frozen swamps. On February 7, the Germans began pushing back the Russian southern flank despite a fierce snowstorm, so Russian General Sivers conducted a retreat in good order. Then, the German 10th army struck in the north. Sivers didn't think the enemy had enough strength to threaten both his flanks, and when the Russian cavalry

quickly retreated away from the main Russian force, he lost track of German movements. The Germans broke through and advanced over 100km in a week despite harsh winter conditions: "We can barely make out our route, all that can be seen are vast, white expanses of snow. The only signposts to guide the way are scraps of straw nailed to the trees. Then even these run out as there are no trees left in sight. What is road, trench, field? Everything is just one huge expanse of snow." (Lloyd 105) By the time Sivers realized the danger, the Germans had reached the Augustowo forest behind him. They trapped an entire

Russian corps in the forest, which conducted a desperate fighting retreat as units tried to escape. A Russian officer described the chaos: "The forest roads were so crowded with various carts that it became impossible to transport cartridges from ammunition park carts. As the fire ceased, the soldiers disposed of artillery equipment, gun locks, and where possible, the guns themselves, by throwing them into the river. Horses were shot with revolvers so as not to increase the enemy's trophies. The agony of defence proceeded slowly but surely.

Dense lines of enemy soldiers approached closer and closer after their artillery ceased fire. Our troops, having shot all their ammunition, sold their lives dearly." (Lloyd 105) Most of the trapped Russian corps surrendered after a week in the forest. Meanwhile, the southern German pincer reached and besieged the Russian fortress of Osowiec but the fort held out. The Kaiser himself visited the front to observe progress, but soon after the Russians launched multiple counterattacks, which pushed the front line mostly back to the pre-war border in March.

The 2nd Battle of Masurian Lakes, also known as the Battle of Augustowo, was a German operational success. Casualty estimates vary, but the Germans suffered up to 60,000 killed and wounded and 10,000 captured, while the Russians lost up to 100,000 killed and wounded and up to 85,000 captured. Sivers was dismissed, East Prussia had been fully liberated, and the subsequent Russian offensive was much smaller than planned, but Augustowo was not strategically decisive. So the Germans had inflicted heavy losses on the Russians in the northwest, but did not

achieve a decisive result. That did not affect Conrad's resolve to try again in the mountains. After the failure of the first Habsburg offensive, Conrad moved the 2nd Army into the line between the 3rd and Southern Armies. Its commander, Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli, doubted whether his weakened formation could break through, especially when a thaw briefly set it and turned the frozen roads to mud. Morale was low all along the line, with troops and officers despairing at the hopeless attacks. Many blamed Conrad, but some falsely scapegoated the local Ukrainians and Jews:

"The entire local peasant population was nearly unanimously on the Russian side thanks to clever and comprehensive Propaganda. And they spied very actively. The Jews were the only exception: they spied equally for both sides. […] For our troops […] being surrounded by treason and espionage was intolerable [and] undermined the last hope for the future." (Österreichisches Bundesministerium 175-177) [Georg Veith] The offensive began February 27, but the mud was so bad much of 2nd Army's artillery had not been moved up to support it. Both sides

inflicted terrible losses on the other, but the Austrians suffered more - the 2nd and 3rd Armies reported up to 40,000 men missing in action on the first day alone (Rachamimov). Fierce blizzards set in on March 1, killing more and more Habsburg soldiers who could not dig trenches or dugouts in the frozen ground - 2nd Army alone lost 17,000 men to frostbite in a single week. Austrian officer Siegmund Knaus bore witness: "Men exhausted from weeks of fighting could not allow themselves to sleep at night, as this would mean immediately freezing to death. […] The

infantry stood exposed and immobile in front of the enemy positions, most of the artillery was still three or four marches behind the front. That all this physical suffering ultimately paved the way for the collapse of morale should not come as a surprise." (Rauchensteiner 314) When 4th Army's supporting attack also failed, Conrad finally called a halt to the futile operation. His army was in tatters, and the Russians still controlled the mountain passes. So by early March, a second Habsburg offensive in the Carpathians had failed miserably, and it was clear Przemysl could not be saved.

As the fighting in the mountains raged, Przemysl's 130,000 man garrison and 30,000 civilians continued to hold out. Russian forces stormed the fortress back in 1914 but failed, so they decided to starve the Austro-Hungarians into surrender. Kusmanek tried a breakout in 1914 but it also failed. Meat became rare from December 1914, and the garrison slaughtered 10,000 horses for food. As time passed, a breakout became less likely as men became weaker. The rank-and-file suffered first from the food shortage, then the civilians, and only later the officers.

By February, there were reports of cats and dogs being sold for food, and Kusmanek calculated they could hold out until March. The starving troops spent scarce energy on firefights with the Russians, and dangerous excursions to gather scarce wood to burn. Kusmanek decided that honor required one last effort, but his forces were too weak to reach the Carpathians 100km away. So he decided on a raid to the east, to destroy as many Russian supplies and troops as possible before surrendering. Kusmanek, though, gave a speech saying they would break out towards friendly forces who were close by - which wasn't true.

Part of the garrison attacked on March 19, but the well-prepared Russians stopped it immediately. Kusmanek ordered the garrison to destroy their weapons, kill the remaining horses, and wreck the fortifications. A captured Russian officer inside recalled the moment: "The sun had already risen, and the plumes of smoke, lit up by the sun, presented a beautiful scene. The thunder and crash of the explosions went on uninterruptedly. It was impossible to get near a window; one was flung backwards. The panic had become terrible. At every explosion

the doors were blown open. Bridges, powder magazines, stores, everything was blown up in two hours." (Horne 105) [Russian officer] On March 22, some 120,000 Habsburg troops, 2500 officers, and 9 generals surrendered, along with 1000 guns. A Russian officer described the scenes to American journalist Stanley Washburn: "The most horrible sight I have ever seen in war…Hungarian soldiers, crazed for want of food, their hands and faces smeared with blood as they devoured the raw dripping bits of flesh, gouged with their knives and fingers from the bodies of newly-killed horses." (David stone 144) [Russian officer] Tsar Nicholas II wrote to his wife that the

news of the capitulation was "an unexpected ray of sunshine" on the first day of spring. Now that Przemysl had fallen, General Ivanov felt the time had come for a final offensive to break the Habsburg army in the Carpathians once and for all. Once again, there were fierce debates amongst the Russian generals as to where they should focus their efforts. Ruszky still argued for his Northwest Front, while Stavka wanted to recapture the ground lost in Bukovina. Ivanov, though, insisted on the Carpathians again. In the end, the main attack would be Ivanov's plan to break through into the Hungarian plain, the newly-arrived 9th Army would advance in Bukovina, and Ruszky resigned.

The Russian counterattacks in March began in Bukovina, where Pflanzer-Baltin's Austro-Hungarians had made good progress in February. The Russian 9th Army retook Stanislau but Habsburg forces withdrew in good order and made skillful use of their cavalry to cover the retreat of the infantry. Pflanzer-Baltin managed to hold on to Czernowitz and bring the Russian advance to a halt by March 20. For this relative success, he received the commander's cross of the Militär-Maria-Theresia-Orden, Austria-Hungary's highest decoration. Brusilov's 8th Army led the main effort over familiar ground in the mountains, starting March 19. They focused on the junction between the exhausted Habsburg 2nd and 3rd Armies,

beyond which lay the flatlands and the chance to cut off the enemy armies from behind. If it worked, it would be a major, and possibly decisive, strategic victory. To counter the threat, the Germans had sent more reinforcements in the form of the Beskidenkorps. In the usual mountain conditions, the Russians advanced painstakingly but steadily thanks to superior numbers and firepower. Fierce fighting raged back and forth, with the Russians gaining some ground at heavy cost, before Central Powers counterattacks took some positions back.

The Austro-Hungarians lacked reserves to throw into the battle, and the troops' morale and physical endurance reached its limit. Attrition was so high that the average soldier only lasted 5 weeks at the front until he became a casualty (Rauchensteiner 313). Conrad's sons Erwin and Egon were at the front, and he wrote of his worries to his mistress Gina von Reinghaus: "Against these [strong Russian formations] stood my beloved old division […] in which Erwin is serving. I cannot describe to you what feelings this brings up in me […] When [Egon] had to return

to the front, that was very difficult for me - what will become of that lovely boy?" (Dornik 154) Suicide rates spiked, and thousands deserted. The most prominent incident was on April 3, when the mostly Czech 28th Infantry Regiment of 1800 men surrendered en masse to the enemy. Many at the time and since have argued the Czechs (and other Habsburg Slavs) deserted because they were disloyal, and the army temporarily disbanded the regiment in disgust. But historians now argue that the regiment surrendered out of sheer exhaustion and low morale, not for political reasons. From

1915 onwards though, many Habsburg commanders no longer trusted many of their own troops. By early April, the Russians had captured the Dukla Pass and reached the very edge of the mountains. The Austrian 3rd Army and parts of the 4th and 2nd were on the edge of total collapse. But the Russians were suffering high losses too, and logistics simply couldn't keep up: "We had to follow narrow paths laid through the deep snow of a dense forest. Spring was burgeoning and the snow became loose, which made the road almost impassable. […] The horses were completely exhausted, they could not carry the heavy loads,

and the soldiers had to pull out carts and guns with their own hands. In some places, we had to line the ground with felled trees so that we could tow our heavy guns through the deep snow." (Lloyd 115) [Russian soldier] By April 10, Ivanov admitted his armies were exhausted, short of shells, and could not break through. The Carpathian campaign of 1915 was over. The first four months of 1915 witnessed a titanic struggle on the Eastern Front, in East Prussia, the Carpathians, Bukovina, and at Przemysl. Both sides suffered staggering casualties:

Austro-Hungarian casualty estimates range from 600-800,000; the Germans lost perhaps 100,000; and the Russians between 900,000 and 1.2 million. These figures even surpass those of the Somme or Verdun the following year. Ironically, the Austro-Hungarians lost far more men trying to save Przemysl than there were in the fortress. But despite the bloodletting the front was still stuck in a stalemate. Both sides failed to concentrate their efforts, and tried to achieve more than their means allowed. The Austro-Hungarians, however, were in the worst position. The Germans trusted them even less after their Carpathian failures,

which were so poorly planned even the Austrian official history called them "a cruel folly." The imperial and royal army was little more than a militia whose commanders often suspected their Slavic troops of disloyalty. If Austria-Hungary was to survive, a dramatic turn of events was needed - and it wouldn't be long before the tide turned in the East. The Carpathian region was soon engulfed in war again. In 1916 Romania entered the war and the Central Powers campaign against Romania ravaged the country and their population.

One of the Romanian families witnessing the war was the Ceaușescu family which soon welcomed their third child Nicolae. While communist revolutions like in Hungary, Slovakia or Germany failed in 1919, the Bolsheviks won the Russian Civil War and young Nicolae Ceaușescu became a member of the Romanian Communist party in the 1930s. During and after the Second World War he rose through the ranks and eventually became one of the most notorious communist leaders in Europe. If you want to learn more about Ceaușescu and his rule, check out the new series Mad Kings by Real

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The Lifetime membership allows us to invest in more original content and improve the platform for everyone. One third of your Lifetime membership will also support us at Real Time History directly. We'd like to thank Leander Lerch for his help with this episode. If you want to learn more about the Eastern Front of the First World War, check out our videos about the Russian Great Retreat and the Brusilov Offensive. As usual, you can find all the sources we used in the video description below. If you are watching this video on Patreon or Nebula, thank you so much for the support we

couldn't do it without you. I am Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that wants you to know Pflanzer-Baltin's nickname was Bald her, bald hin.